Logic and the Trinity by Macnamara, John et al.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 11 Issue 1 Article 1 
1-1-1994 
Logic and the Trinity 
John Macnamara 
Marie La Palme Reyes 
Gonzalo E. Reyes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Macnamara, John; Reyes, Marie La Palme; and Reyes, Gonzalo E. (1994) "Logic and the Trinity," Faith and 
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 11 : Iss. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol11/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
LOGIC AND THE TRINITY 
John Macnamara, Marie La Palme Reyes, Gonzalo E. Reyes 
The paper gives a model of the sentences that express the core of the doctrine 
of the Trinity. The new elements in the model are: (1) an underlying map 
between DIVINE PERSON and GOD-in place of set-theoretic inclusion, 
and (2) the notion of a predicable keeping or not keeping phase in a system 
of kinds. These elements, which are explained in the text, are common in 
everyday language. The model requires no tampering with the fundamental 
laws of logic, nor does it require the use of any such difficult metaphysical 
notions as substance and essence as distinct from person. 
"Licet enim Trinitas Personarum demonstratione probari non possit. .. con-
venit tamen, ut per aJiqua magis manifesta declaretur." 
-St. Thomas Aquinas, S.Th., q. 39, art. 6. 
1. Introduction 
The doctrine of the Trinity poses a well known logical puzzle: to show that 
it is not inconsistent to hold that there are three distinct Divine Persons, each 
of them God, and yet that there is only one God. The past few decades, not 
surprisingly, have seen several attempts to deal with the logic of the Trinity. 
These include Rahner (1970), Geach (1972), Power (1978), Martinich (1978), 
Davis (1983), LaCugna (1986) and Cartwright (1987). We will return to some 
of these. For the moment suffice it to say that Cartwright, while rejecting 
some proposed solutions, offers no solution of his own. Davis, perhaps, 
speaks for the field as a whole: 
I do not dogmaticalIy hold that the doctrine can never be shown to be coher-
ent. I only claim that this has not yet been achieved. (p. 140) 
Now if the doctrine of the Trinity really were inconsistent, then it could not 
express the central truth ofthe Christian religion and necessarily at least some 
of the claims made in stating the doctrine would be false. It is useless in this 
context to appeal to mystery. Only reality can be a mystery; inconsistency 
rules out reality. 
It is equally unacceptable to seek refuge from apparent paradox in talk 
about the historical development of doctrine or the deep significance of the 
Trinity for salvation history. Undoubtedly the doctrine of the Trinity under-
went important development and undoubtedly no logical analysis is going to 
illuminate the significance of the doctrine for salvation history or personal 
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spiritual life. Nonetheless, if the doctrine really were inconsistent, its histori-
cal development would be of historical interest only. 
It is rare to find records of a logician explicitly denying the consistency of 
the doctrine of the Trinity. Few logicians write about the matter and those 
who do are usually sympathetic. A logician who seems to have denied its 
consistency, one deeply read in the history of theology, was Franz Brentano-
at least if we are to believe his student and friend Carl Stumpf. 
Brentano's motives [for leaving the Catholic Church] were of a theoretical 
nature, they were simply the result of internal contradictions in the Church's 
doctrine which even his penetrating mind, after years of wrestling with the 
problem, could not resolve .... On 19 November (1870) he wrote to me in 
GoUingen of an enneakilemma, a nine-term disjunction, in which he summa-
rized the contradictions in the dogma of the Trinity (Stumpf, 1976, pp. 23-
24). 
2. The Role of Logic 
The literature shows considerable confusion about the nature of a logical 
analysis in the study of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity is expressed 
in human language; the core of it in quite straightforward language. If the 
sentences expressing the core are to say anything at all, they must be mutually 
consistent. The trinity, we are told, is a mystery surpassing human under-
standing; the same cannot be said about the sentences that express the Trinity. 
It is not for logic to perform the important job of assessing the truth of those 
sentences, or their religious significance either for salvation history or for 
personal spiritual life. It is simply to explore the mutual consistency of those 
sentences. 
One shows a set of sentences to be consistent by giving a model for them. 
A model for a set of sentences is an interpretation of the set in which each 
sentence is true. The difficult part of giving a model of the doctrine of the 
Trinity is to give for all the expressions used an interpretation that is in 
keeping with the logical principles that handle the interpretation of natural-
language sentences. The interpretation need not be the natural or even the 
orthodox one. It must respect the logical structure of the sentences and should 
retain the standard interpretation ofthe quantifiers and sentential connectives. 
Such a model merely shows that the set of sentences is capable of a consistent 
interpretation. 
The notion of a model seems not to have been clearly grasped in the middle 
ages. St. Thomas Aquinas seeks to explain the theological significance of the 
doctrine of the Trinity at the same time as he defends it from charge of 
inconsistency. As far as we know, the concept of a model comes clearly into 
focus only with the work on non-Euclidean geometry in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Since the task of giving a model is largely distinct from that of explain-
ing significance, it follows that considerations of the historical origins of such 
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words as "person," so crucial in stating the doctrine, are irrelevant to the task 
of giving a model. It follows further that the choice of sentences to express 
the core of the Trinitarian doctrine is far less sensitive than writers like 
LaCugna (1986) would have us believe. 
We can best grasp the role of logic by considering the words of a logician 
about the doctrine of the Trinity. In a recently published article Richard 
Cartwright (1987) writes: 
The heretical conclusion [that there are three Gods] follows, by the general 
principle that if every A is a B, then there cannot be fewer B's than A's. This 
principle, I claim, is evident to the natural light of reason. Thus, if every cat 
is an animal, there cannot be fewer animals than cats; if every senator from 
Massachusetts is a Democrat, there cannot be fewer Democrats than senators 
from Massachusetts. Just so, if every Divine Person is a God, there cannot 
be fewer Gods than Divine Persons. (p. 196) 
The excerpt, which forms part of an analysis of the writings of Peter Geach 
on individuation and identity, must not be taken as indicating that Cartwright 
rejects the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity; only that he finds a particular 
statement of it to be essentially inconsistent. One purpose in writing this 
article is to show that there is no such general principle as he claims in the 
passage cited. In particular, we will show that there are simple cases where 
though every A is a B, there are fewer B's than A's. It is not our purpose to 
claim that Cartwright's rejection of Geach's writings on identity and indi-
viduation is unjustified or that Geach's writings on these matters are correct. 
We can also illustrate the role of logic by making one other comment on 
some of the solutions proposed in the literature. A tempting one is that of 
Martinich (1978). He, in the spirit of Geach, claims that "nothing is identical 
with something absolutely, but only in a certain respect." This leads him to 
propose that, say, while the Father and the Son are identical as God, they are 
different as persons. Unfortunately this neat proposal runs foul of a proof 
given by Wiggins (1980, chap. 1) that if a and b are equal as Gs and if a is 
a member of P, a and b must be equal as Ps. We will not reproduce the proof 
here. Suffice it to say that granted the suppositions that Martinich wishes to 
make, Wiggins's proof settles the matter. 
Peter van Inwagen (1988) also opts for "relative identity" and he manages 
to elude Wiggins's refutation by laying aside Leibniz's law; for the refutation 
requires Leibniz's law. Leibniz's law is to the effect that a = b if and only if 
they share precisely the same properties. This is a very fundamental law of 
logic and van Inwagen is uneasy about dropping it. Indeed he goes so far as 
to say, "As far as I am able to tell, relative-identity logic has no utility outside 
Christian theology" (p. 259). Despite his protests, we find this to be an 
unfortunate admission, especially since Leibniz's law is the guarantee of 
distinctions among the three Divine Persons. Our own model does not involve 
any "tampering" with the foundations of logic. 
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3. Statement of the Doctrine of the Trinity 
Cartwright does us a service by extracting from the Athanasian Creed seven 
sentences that give the core of the Trinitarian problem that concerns us. Since 
nothing relevant to our purposes hangs on the niceties of wording, we can do 
no better than begin with them. 
(1) The Father is God. 
(2) The Son is God. 
(3) The Holy Spirit if God. 
(4) The Father is not the Son. 
(5) The Father is not the Holy Spirit. 
(6) The Son is not the Holy Spirit. 
(7) There is exactly one God. 
With this set of sentences as it stands Cartwright has no quarrel. Trouble 
begins only when he considers various reformulations designed to make their 
logic more evident. First, he notes, correctly, that we cannot, on pain of 
heresy, interpret the "is" of (1)-(3) as expressing identity. For if a unique God 
really were identical with the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit, then these three 
would have to be one and the same Divine Person. This follows from the 
logic of identity: if a = b and a = c, then b = c. An identity reading of "is" 
here would force either the heresy that there are three Gods (Tritheism) or 
the heresy that there is only one Divine Person (Sabellianism). There is, however, 
no problem in interpreting the "is" of sentences (4)-(6) as expressing identity. 
They can be read as saying that the Father is not identical with the Son or 
with the Holy Spirit and that the Son is not identical with the Holy Spirit. 
Cartwright next considers a reformulation that inserts the indefinite article 
before the word "God" in (1)-(3). This treats "God" clearly as a count noun 
and yields sentences on the model of "Socrates is a person." The new set is: 
(1a) The Father is a God. 
(2a) The Son is a God. 
(3a) The Holy Spirit is a God. 
(4a) The Father is not identical with the Son. 
(5a) The Father is not identical with the Holy Spirit. 
(6a) The Son is not identical with the Holy Spirit. 
(7a) There is exactly one God. 
Cartwright declares that this is an inconsistent set. What seems to be guiding 
his judgment is a set-theoretic interpretation of (la)-(3a) which takes the set 
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of Divine Persons to be a subset of the set of Gods. The inclusion relation 
among sets is one-one in this sense: If A is included in B, then for each 
member of A there is a member of B identical with it and, identity being a 
symmetric relation, there are as many B's identical with A's as there are A's 
with B's. The identity implicated in set inclusion implies that the B's cannot 
be less numerous than the A's. If, indeed, Divine Persons were a subset of 
Gods, then the matter would end there, for on the inclusion interpretation of 
set theory there would have to be as many Gods as Divine Persons. It is 
obvious, then, that the relation between Divine Persons and God(s) cannot 
be construed as one of set-theoretic inclusion-if we are to hold on to ortho-
doxy. We need instead some other interpretation of that relation. Cartwright 
comes to the conclusion that no other interpretation of (1a)-(3a) is possible. 
He claims further that we know this by "the natural light of reason." It is this 
conclusion that we contest. Davis (1983), using the noun "thing," reaches 
essentially the same conclusion. 
4. Prolegomena to the Model 
We begin by giving commonplace examples where each A is a B and yet there 
are fewer B's than A's. We then go on to explain informally the logic behind 
the example in sufficient detail to reveal the relation between the A's and B's 
and show how it leads to the model for (la)-(7a) that is described in the next 
section. We then explain the logic of predicables (mainly adjectival and 
verbal phrases) that modify the relevant count nouns-still in an informal 
manner. 
Let us suppose that Smith makes three distinct trips with Canadian Airways 
in 1990, one in May, another in September and still another in October. The 
company will correctly claim to have carried three passengers even though 
these three particular passengers are associated with only a single person. 
While every passenger is a person the number of persons is smaller than the 
number of passengers. (We borrow the example from Gupta (1980).) This 
example is a modern version of the problem of counting heralds that comes 
from the Middle Ages. We can represent this example with the help of the 
following diagram adding another person who has also travelled on different 
occasions. 
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Pl ... P5 are different passengers. The set of passengers is mapped into the set 
of persons. The cardinality of the set of passengers is 5, while the cardinality 
of the set of persons is 2. Clearly the relation between passengers and persons 
is not set-theoretic inclusion. Instead, there is an underlying map between the 
two kinds in precisely this sense, that one and only one person underlies each 
passenger. A single person, however, can underlie several passengers. The 
underlying relation is expressed in English by the heavily burdened copula 
"is." Other examples of the same phenomenon are patients admitted to a 
hospital, diners in a restaurant and customers in a shop. The counts of pa-
tients, diners and customers need not equal the corresponding counts of per-
sons. Particularly interesting for us is the case of majors in a university. A 
single person can at one and the same time major in philosophy and mathe-
matics. The Department of Philosophy and Mathematics will separately in-
clude the student in their lists of majors and the university will add the lists 
and count two majors although only one person is involved. Other such 
examples are patients and professors. A single person can simultaneously be 
the patient of a urologist and of a heart specialist: that is be two patients. A 
person can be a professor in two separate universities. There are many such 
examples. They are particularly relevant because the Divine Persons, being 
eternal, are simultaneously a single God. 
The first and most important component in our model will be the underlying 
map from the kind DIVINE PERSON into the kind GOD. This is the map 
which associates with each Divine Person a single God. 
Sentences (I a)-(3a) refer to the Divine Persons by definite descriptions 
which in the case function like proper names. The logic of proper names is 
that they denote an individual in a kind-which kind is crucial, because the 
function of the kind is objectively to specify the bearer and determine the 
bearer's identity. Since the matter is crucial, it is important to grasp it firmly. 
Not all the count nouns that come into play with the use of a proper name 
denote the kind that specifies the bearer and determines its identity. One may 
be introduced to a person with the words "This is my wife, Jane." But "wife" 
does not handle the identity of the bearer, since the lady in question was Jane 
before she became anyone's wife. Even "woman" will not do, for Jane was 
once a girl and not a woman. Even the collection of molecules that constitutes 
Jane's body is not what bears the name "Jane." That collection is changing 
constantly, but Jane remains the same person. It would seem that what does 
the job correctly is the kind PERSON. Because through alI the changes of 
life, with its various stages and states, Jane is the same person. 
The general conclusion is that a kind is implicit in the interpretation of a 
proper name. (For a further argument see Macnamara, 1986, and La Palme 
Reyes, Macnamara & Reyes, 1994.) Although "thing" and "object" are count 
nouns they will not, independent of more particular count nouns, perform the 
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logical functions to which we are drawing attention. If on their own "thing" 
and "object" really were, logically, common nouns, they would have a uni-
versal extension-everything would be a thing. To allow this would be, in 
effect, to allow bare particulars; and it is a fundamental principle of the logic 
of kinds that there are no bare particulars. To see why not consider the 
following. When one points to Smith and says "That is Smith," there is no 
knowing how many things or objects one is pointing to-persons, limbs, 
organs, cells, molecules, etc. Since there is no individuating under "thing" or 
"object," neither is there any provision for identity. Individuation and identity 
require a more specific count noun, such as "molecule," or "person." We return 
to the interpretation of such words as "thing" and "object" in section 7. 
More particularly, the conclusion we are leading up to is that the proper 
names in (la)-(6a) are interpreted in conjunction with the count nouns "Di-
vine Person"; not "God," mind you. In other words, the expressions "the 
Father," "the Son" and "the Holy Spirit" are picking out individuals in the 
kind DIVINE PERSON, not in the kind GOD. The reason for this is that 
"God" does not handle identity correctly. For the Trinitarian sentences say 
that there is only one God, yet the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinct 
Divine Persons. It follows that "God" neither individuates nor specifies the 
identity of that which is referred to by "the Father" or by "the Son" or by 
"the Holy Spirit." Indeed the Athanasian Creed as much as says this: "the 
Father's person is one, the Son's another, the Holy Spirit's another" (p. 18; 
all citations of the Athanasian Creed are taken from Kelly, 1964). 
This leads us to the following readings of (Ia)-(3a): 
(Ia') Underlying the Divine Person that is the Father is a God. 
(2a') Underlying the Divine Person that is the Son is a God. 
(3a') Underlying the Divine Person that is the Holy Spirit is a God. 
Sentence (7) says that there is exactly one God. It follows that the Trinitarian 
doctrine is that although the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are three 
distinct Divine Persons, the God that underlies the Father and the God that 
underlies the Son and the God that underlies the Holy Spirit, is one and the 
same God. We can illustrate the nature of the underlying relation by returning 
to passengers and persons. As we mentioned before the underlying relation 
is a function that associates with each passenger a unique person. It also 
satisfies the condition that if a passenger is present in any situation, the 
underlying person is also present in that situation. When counting passengers, 
then, we distinguish among them by the times in which they travel. Thus even 
if Canadian Airway's flight from Montreal to Toronto at 9:00 a.m. is always 
numbered CA 230 (that is, is counted always as the same flight), a passenger 
on Monday and a passenger on Tuesday will be registered as different pas-
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sengers even though it is the same person who travels. Time, then, is of basic 
importance in distinguishing among passengers. 
Time cannot play the role of distinguishing among Divine Persons, who 
are eternal and unchanging. How, then, can we understand the three Divine 
Persons to be distinct? To answer, we must appeal to Leibniz's law of identity. 
It says that any two objects a and b are identical if and only if they have 
exactly the same properties. It follows from this principle that if we want to 
show a and b to be distinct all we have to do is to show a property that a 
does and b does not have. Properties distinctive of each Divine Person are 
supplied by the Athanasian Creed: 
The Father is from none, not made nor created nor begotten. The Son is from 
the Father alone, not made nor created, but begotten. The Holy Spirit is from the 
Father and the Son, not made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding (p. 
19). 
More succinctly, the Father alone generates the Son; the Son alone is gener-
ated by the Father; the Holy Spirit alone proceeds from the Father and the 
Son. It is not our intention to try to interpret the words "generate" and 
"proceed" in this context, beyond to say with Cajetan (1506/1963) that they 
apply analogically to Divine Persons and to human persons. All that is needed 
for our purposes is that the words name different analogical relations. It is 
clearly the intention of the author(s) of the Athanasian Creed that they should. 
We must now study the relation between the individuating properties for 
the Divine Persons and show that while they individuate the Divine Persons, 
they do not force an equally numerous individuation among Gods. We can 
illustrate the way the danger might arise by considering just two of the 
individuating properties. The Father alone among the Divine Persons has the 
property of generating the Son. The Father is God, however; so it might seem 
that a God has the property of generating the Son. Likewise, the Son has the 
property that alone among the Divine Persons he is generated by the Father. 
But the Son is God; so it might seem that God has the property of being 
generated by the Father. If those two properties were sufficient to distinguish 
one Divine Person from another, why are they not sufficient to distinguish 
one God from another? This line of thought would lead to the claim that if 
the individuating properties individuate three Divine Persons, then they in-
dividuate three Gods; one for each Divine Person. 
What blocks this line of reasoning, and the heretical conclusion, is that in 
the theory of kinds predicables are typed by count nouns. Such typing is 
common in everyday language. The predicable "white" applied to human skin 
and to paper denotes very different colours. The predicable "silly" applied to a 
goose and to a person denotes different properties. The predicable "dull" applied 
to a knife and to a day also denotes quite different properties. The predicable 
"run" applied to a dog and to a government denotes very different actions. 
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The phenomenon also crops up in connection with kinds that are in the 
underlying relation. Plato drew attention to the fact that although every thief 
is a person, a good thief may not be a good person. Similarly, although every 
baby is a person, a big baby is not a big person. Although every person is an 
animal, it does not follow that a white person is a white animal; white animal 
being exemplified by white rabbits and white mice, which are of a quite 
different shade from the skin of white people. Although every passenger is a 
person, it does not follow that a good passenger is a good person. At the same 
time not all predicables behave in this way; every male horse is a male animal, 
every winged bird is a winged animal, every old man is an old person, etc. 
The second important component in our model of the Trinity is the claim 
that the individuating predicables-"begets the Son," is begotten by the Fa-
ther" and "proceeds from the Father and the Son"-behave like "big" as 
applied to BABY and PERSON. In a terminology that we make precise in 
the next section we say that the individuating predicables do not keep phase 
as they transfer from "Divine Person" to "God." This logical fact blocks the 
threat of either Tritheism or Sabellianism. We see here a departure from the 
interpretation of "begets" and "begotten" in connection with other kinds. For 
example, if a philosophy major begets a daughter, the underlying person 
begets a daughter. If a philosophy major was begotten by Smith, so was the 
underlying person. A capital point in our theory of count nouns and predica-
bles is that a predicable's keeping phase is defined relative to a system of 
kinds. The system that concerns us here has just two members: DIVINE 
PERSON and GOD. 
Notice that to motivate this model we did not appeal to any such difficult 
notions as essence as distinct from person (which pervades Aquinas's treat-
ment of the Trinity) or to a distinction between substance and person (S. Th. 
1, q. 30, art. 1, ad. 1), or to a contrast between identity in the thing itself and 
distinction in the theory of the thing (S.Th. 1, q. 28, art. 3; 1, q. 39, art. 1). 
Of course Aquinas's objective is as far as possible to explain the meaning 
of the doctrine of the Trinity, whereas ours is simply to give a model for it. 
Nonetheless, it is consoling that without the support of erudite (though ven-
erable) notions from scholastic metaphysics, one can build so straightforward 
a model. 
5. Presentation of the Model 
We now go on to make certain notions introduced in section 3 more precise 
and to specify the model. We begin with the notion of a kind, which is the 
reference of a count noun. 
We think of a kind as a set together with an existence map. For example 
the kind PASSENGER comprises the set P of all the passengers that ever 
were, are and will be together with the map Ep that assigns to each passenger 
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the set of situations, factual and counterfactual, in which the passenger ap-
pears. We can represent the kind PASSENGER as (P, Ep). We will not attempt 
to be more precise about the meaning of "situations," or "appearance in a 
situation" since our particular purpose does not require us to do so. Since the 
three Divine Persons are eternal, we need not consider their domain of "ex-
istence." Even the Son is eternal, as the Athanasian Creed states, only as a 
man is he born in time: "He is God from the Father's substance, begotten 
before time; and he is man from his mother's substance, born in time" (p. 
19). We do not consider the kind MAN in our model. 
In our model we then have the kinds DIVINE PERSON and GOD and an 
underlying map u: DIVINE PERSON ~ GOD. First let us look at the syntax. 
We considered a two-sorted language, where the sorts are d (for Divine 
Person) and g (for God). The constants are P, S, H, G (thought of as the Father 
(Progenitor), the Son, the Holy Ghost and God respectively). The first three 
are sorted by d and the last is sorted by g. The predicables are sorted by either 
d or g. The predicables sorted by dare: gd, dd, ed, bSd, bnd, Pd, Cd, (thought 
of as "is a God," "is a divine person," "is eternal," "begets the Son," is 
begotten by the Father," "proceeds from the Father and Son" and "creates the 
world" respectively). The predicables sorted by g are: gg, dg, eg, bsg, bng, pg 
and Cg. We are not very rigorous in the presentation of our language but for 
the purpose of this article we believe we are formal enough. 
We interpret the count noun "divine person" as the kind DIVINE PERSON 
with three elements P, S, H thought of as the interpretation of the constants 
P, S, H: and the count noun "God" as the kind GOD which contains just one 
element G thought of as the interpretation of the constant G. Furthermore we 
have the set of truth-values (T,F) where T stands for truth and F stands for 
falsity, and the unique underlying map u: (P,S,H) ~ (G). 
A predicable of Divine Person is interpreted as a map 
(P,S,H) ~ (T,F) 
and a predicable of God is interpreted as a map from (G) to (T,F). Let us 
represent all this in a diagram taking the predicable "eternal" as an example. 
u 
DIVINE PERSON = (F,S,H) I (G) = GOD 
~leg 
(T,F) 
The predicable ed is interpreted as the map from DIVINE PERSON into (T,F) 
(call the map ed) which yields ed (P) = T, ed(S) = T, and ed(H) = T; the 
predicable eg is interpreted as the map eg from GOD into (T,F) defined by 
eg(G) = T. 
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We now give some definitions relating to predicables. We say that the 
family of interpretations of a single predicable keeps phase relative to a 
system of kinds if and only if for any pair of kinds in the system that are in 
the underlying relation u the following diagram commutes 
u A~i~ 
(T,F) 
By commuting we mean that for any a E A, <Xa (a) = ab (u(a». For example, 
take the various kinds that are in the underlying relation with PERSON in 
our system and take "male" as our predicable. We say "male" keeps phase 
relative to the system if and only if all such diagrams as the following 
commute 
u 
BABY -------, PERSON 
m'le'~ / mal", 
(T,F) 
Turn back to the more general diagram. The predicable a keeps phase if and 
only if the family of its interpretations keeps phase. 
We turn again to the Trinitarian doctrine a)ld apply this theory to complete 
our model. We recall that we have (P,S,Hl~·tG); and we have the various 
predicables typed alternatively by DIVINE PERSON and GOD. We can tabu-
late the truth value for each of the predicables as applied to each of the 
constants in the two kinds. 
Sort Interpretation Sort Interpretation Keep Phase 
d p S H g G 
g T T T T yes 
d T T T F no 
e T T T T yes 
bs T F F F no 
bn F T F F no 
c F F F T no 
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The essential point of the model is that it accounts for (i) there being three 
Divine Persons, each being God, and yet there being only one God; (ii) the 
fact that the predicables that individuate the Divine Persons do not keep phase 
and so do not individuate among Gods. 
6. The Original Formulation 
The original formulation of the Trinitarian doctrine is given in sentence (1) 
- (7) which Cartwright correctly derived from the Athanasian Creed. Recall 
that the difference is that in the original formulation of (1) - (3) there is no 
indefinite article before "God." Cartwright's argument was that to read, for 
example, 
(1) The Father is God 
as 
(la) The Father is a God 
leads to heresy. We have seen that it does not. Nevertheless we should ask 
ourselves if (1) is logically equivalent to (1a). We are strongly inclined to 
think it is. St. Thomas (S. Th. 1, q. 13, art. 9, ad. 2) says that "God" is not 
a proper name (nomen proprium) but a common noun (nomen appelativum). 
The reason he gives is that "God" ("deus") has a plural, "Gods" ("dii"). 
Indeed the plural "dii" occurs in the Athanasian Creed. What he means is that 
while it is false to say there are many Gods, it makes sense to ask if there 
are many Gods. Whereas, given a proper name for an individual "Joseph," it 
makes no sense to ask if there are many Josephs (not meaning many different 
persons bearing the name "Joseph" but many of this individual that bears the 
name "Joseph"). In support of Aquinas's view, Geach (1961, p. 109) points 
out that "God" is translated into other languages, not transliterated as are 
proper nouns. Durrant (1973, chap. 1) reaches the same conclusion. Alto-
gether we find the evidence that "God" in (1) is not a proper name to be quite 
convincing. 
So why is the Athanasian Creed normally translated as "the Father is God, 
the Son God and the Holy Spirit God" (ita deus Pater, deus Filius, deus 
Spiritus Sanetus)? Why not translate as "the Father is a God etc."? Since 
Latin, the original language of the Athanasian Creed (which seems to be 
incorrectly attributed to St. Athanasius), does not have either a definite or an 
indefinite article, the issue we are discussing does not arise in Latin. (Inci-
dentally, Greek does not have an indefinite article either.) The reason for the 
English translation seems to be insistence on monotheism in the style of the 
wording. Certainly the declaration "I believe in God" strikes one as rather 
different from "I believe in a God." The former seems to presuppose mono-
theism, the latter not. For all that, we would like to say that the logical form 
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of "The Father is God" is the same as that of "The Father is a God." That 
follows from the arguments of Aquinas and Geach to the effect that "God" 
is a common noun. The Athanasian Creed need not presuppose monotheism 
since it explicitly states it: "and yet there are not three Gods, but there is one 
God" (et tamen non tres dii. sed un us est deus). Incidentally, the pluralization 
of "God" indicates that in the Creed the word is not construed as an abstract 
noun on a par with "justice," which behaves linguistically like a mass noun. 
Although such nouns do not take the indefinite article, they do not have 
plurals. 
This all leads to the conclusion that Cartwright was not justified in taking 
(1a) - (7a) to differ in logical form from (1) - (7). 
7. The Notion of an Entity in a System of Kinds 
There is a puzzling sequence of declarations in the Athanasian Creed. It says 
that each of the three Divine Persons is "increate" (increatus), "infinite" 
(immensus) and "eternal"; nevertheless there are not three increates, three 
that are infinite, three that are eternal. It also says that each of the Divine 
Persons is "almighty" and "Lord," but that there are not three that are al-
mighty or three that are Lord. The expressions go back at least to St. 
Augustine in De Trinitate. Aquinas (S.Th. 1, q. 33, art. 2, ad. 5) settles the 
matter by simply saying that there are three that are increate, etc. if we count 
Divine Persons; not if we count Gods. While we agree with him, we believe 
that there is a definite sense in which there is only one entity or being 
involved in the Trinitarian Doctrine. To motivate the notion of entity we give 
two examples. At a party there may be professors, students, wives, husbands, 
men, women, etc. Nevertheless to find out how many dinners are required. 
the host doesn't add the number of professors and the number of students and 
the number of wives and the number of husbands and ... , etc. since a woman, 
for instance, might be both a wife and a professor. For purposes of catering, 
of course, we count the number of persons attending the party. 
In terms of underlying maps already discussed, we may express this relation 
as follows: (i) underlying every kind such as PROFESSOR, STUDENT, etc., 
there is the kind PERSON. 
PROFESSOR ____ 
STUD ENT -----=::::::::: 
MAN PERSON 
WOMAN----
(ii) Two members of different kinds correspond to the same entity if their 
underlying persons coincide. We represent a particular case with the follow-
ing diagram 
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in which a and a' correspond to the same entity since u'(a) = u'(a') = p 
A second example is provided by the Library of Congress. It contains 
books, manuscripts, palimpsests, encyclopedias, volumes, etc. In this case the 
notion of entity is item, rather than volumes or words or books. We may arrive 
at this notion as follows: make a list of all books, another of all manuscripts, 
another of all palimpsests, etc., and compare them. Some documents will 
appear in the list of manuscripts and also in the list of palimpsests. We express 
the relationship between the palimpsest and the corresponding manuscript as 
follows: 
MANUSCRIPT PALIMPSEST 
Intuitively we identify a of the list of manuscripts with c of the list of 
palimpsests and we consider that a and c constitute only one item. This notion 
of item is a particular case of the general notion of colimit in the theory of 
categories. 
In the case of the Trinitarian Doctrine there is only one entity or being 
obtained by the following identification: 
DIVINE PERSON GOD 
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Aquinas (S.Th. 1, q. 45, art. 6) says that God created the world and that it 
is true to say of the Divine Person the Father, for example, that he created 
the world only insofar as he is God. In our context that passage could be 
interpreted as follows: underlying the Father there is a unique God, who 
created the world. But to return to the passages with which we began this 
section, we now see that while claiming each of the Divine Persons to be 
eternal, infinite, etc., the Athanasian Creed quite intelligibly claims that there 
is only one being that is eternal, infinite, etc. 
Conclusion 
What have we accomplished? We have given a model of the sentences that 
express the core of the doctrine of the Trinity, thus allaying once and for all 
the fear that they are inconsistent. The new elements in the model are (1) an 
underlying map between DIVINE PERSON and GOD in place of the standard 
inclusion maps; (2) the notion of a predicable keeping or not keeping phase 
in a system of kinds. Both notions are very well grounded in everyday lan-
guage. We ended with a third new element, (3) the notion of an ENTITY in 
a system of kinds. With this we are able under certain conditions and for 
certain purposes to treat as identified members of disjoint kinds, while for 
other purposes holding those members distinct.2 
Department of Psychology, McGill University 
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NOTES 
1. St. Thomas seems to say that each Divine Person is identical with God-see S. Th. 
I, q. 39, arts. 1 and 6. This is not, however, as straightforward a statement as it seems to 
be. He distinguishes between identity in the thing itself (in re) and identity in the theory 
of the thing (ratione), saying that each Divine Person is identical with God in re but not 
ratione. Elsewhere (S.Th. I, q. 28, art. 3) he says that the really distinct Divine Persons 
are identical with God not in the manner of an absolute thing but in that of a relative thing. 
The example St. Thomas gives to illustrate his meaning is taken from Aristotle's Physics: 
"although action is identical with change and so is passion. It does not follow that action 
and passion are identical with one another" S. Th. I, q. 28, art. 3, ad. 1. This we find 
difficult to understand: although sense can no doubt be made of it in the context of 
Aristotle's theory of physics. 
2. The authors thank Storrs McCall and Michael Makkai for helpful discussions of an 
earlier draft of the paper. They also thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments. 
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